Dilemma of the water and energy crisis in Pakistan
Since India revoked the special status (Article 370) of the occupied Kashmir and usurped hereditary rights (Article 35-A) of its permanent citizens, the Indus Water Treaty negotiations between India and Pakistan have remained in limbo. The water commissioners of the two nations met in March 2021 (despite being scheduled for 2019) to address concerns that remained after the line of control was at peace. Pakistan's concerns with the plans for Indian hydroelectric projects on the Chenab River were the main topic of discussion. India is constructing the 1,000 MW Pakal Dul Hydroelectric Project on the Chenab tributary river Marusudar. The project is situated in Jammu and Kashmir's Kishtwar district. On the Chenab River, Lower Kalnai, the second project, is being built.
Due to India's belligerent behaviour (surgical strikes, territorial aggression in Kashmir, etc.), the meeting was postponed.
The Indus Waters Treaty, supported by the World Bank, is a water-sharing agreement between India and Pakistan to utilise the water present in the Indus River and its tributaries. The Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers in the west belong to Pakistan, and the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej rivers in the east belong to India, according to the treaty.The Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi rivers, totalling about 33 million acre feet (MAF) annually, are allotted to India for unrestricted use under the terms of the Indus Waters Treaty, while the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers, totalling about 135 MAF annually, primarily go to Pakistan. India has been granted the right, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, to produce hydroelectricity through run-of-the-river projects on the western rivers, subject to particular requirements for design and operation.
The Tarbela Dam on the Indus River and the Mangla Dam on the Jhelum River are only two examples of the dams that the treaty called for funding and constructing.
The Indus River System has been used for irrigation throughout unbroken India since the beginning of time. Modern irrigation engineering, however, dates back to the British era of administration in the 1850s. The 1947 partition of India into the nations of India and Pakistan made the treaty necessary.
David Lilienthal, a former leader of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commision, is credited with seeing the deal through to completion.The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in September 1960 by Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru after six years of negotiations. The Indus-Water Treaty mandated the establishment of a Permanent Indus Commision, consisting of one commissioner from each nation, to settle any disagreements on the layout, style, and other elements of the dams that the two nations may construct on the designated rivers. Despite frequent wars between the two nations, the Indus Treaty held despite bellicose declarations to annul it.
Despite Pakistan's protests, India finished construction of the Kishanganga dam in occupied Kashmir and carried on with work on the Ratle hydroelectric power station on the Chenab River in 2017.
Pakistan struggled to build new dams in the post-Ayub era, especially the Kalabagh Dam. Due to pointless complaints made by the three provinces of Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the dam's construction was delayed.
Pakistan's lawmakers continued to engage in pettifogging or plots to overthrow whichever administration was in power rather than working to reach a compromise on the crucial water projects.
Kalabagh Dam's necessity
Between 2003 and 2005, the Technical Committee on Water Resources gave its approval to this project. However, it has been more than 15 years since the feasibility report was put into action. Currently, it is a point of contention between three of the four provinces (excluding the Punjab). The interprovincial committee was, in fact, made up of eight technical specialists, two from each province.
Along with the development of mangrove forests, the Committee also examined all other factors, such as the impact of mixing seawater and freshwater, seawater seepage into the groundwater, riverine irrigation, and forest fisheries (including the cultivation of Pala fish, shrimp, kharif, and rabi). The World Bank Indus Special Study Group had previously given the project the go-ahead in its 1967 report, Development of Water and Power Resources of Pakistan: A Sectoral Analysis. The expected cost at the time, spread across six years from 1977 to 1982, was US$6.12 billion.
The Tarbela Dam might have been completed by 1982 after inauguration in 1976. The price of 12 billion units of KBD's hydroelectric power was Rs1.5 per unit as opposed to Rs16.5 from thermal sources.
The dam was intended to be a container for storing monsoon floods from the mighty Indus' upper reaches.
At the time, we had a 400–5000 MW power shortfall. The dam's construction was reported to have cost US$6.12 billion and took six years, from 1977 to 1982. The Tarbela Dam might have been completed by 1982 after inauguration in 1976. The price of 12 billion units of hydroelectric power was Rs. 1.5 per unit as opposed to Rs. 16.5 from thermal sources. Due to 10 times more expensive production (12 billion x Rs. 15 billion), we are losing Rs. 180 billion annually. Add a loss of US$6.12 billion annually from the Arabian Sea receiving an extra 30 million Acre Feet of water per year from the Kotri Barrage (each MAF is worth US$1–1.5 billion).
When compared to population growth, from 32.4 million in 1948 to 154.6 million in 2005 and 207.8 million in 2017, our water resource reserves have not increased pari passu. Rivers flow at 84 percent during kharif season but at just 40 percent during rabi season. Pakistan's current water storage capacity is just about 11.77 million acres per feet (MAF), or about 8% of the yearly flow.
Water Crisis Causes
Three provincial assembly made decisions to oppose constructing the KBD. According to a politician, Sind would become a desert as a result of the dam. Reviewing the Water Apportionment Accord should assuage concerns about the project (as instructed by the Lahore High Court in its Order dated November 29, 2012, case number. WP 8777). There is no excuse for killing the goose that produces golden eggs.
Delays-Related Losses
Due to the project's 10-time more expensive development, losses from delays have increased to Rs180 billion year (1990 estimate). In addition, the Arabian Sea receives an extra 30 million acre feet of water each year from the Kotri Barrage, costing $6.12 billion annually. Rivers flow at 84% during the mangrove season, but barely at 40% during the Rabi season. Pakistan's current water storage capacity is just about 11.77MAF, or about 8% of the annual flow.
With the exception of the Punjab province, the legislative assembly of three of our provinces have vehemently opposed building the Kala Bagh Dam. Are they appropriate? In order to respond to the question, we must examine many facets of the dam's construction, including its viability and effects. Since the Eighteenth Amendment was passed, provinces are now responsible for building dams. Water security is still more of a national issue than a regional one, notwithstanding this reality.
Arguments For and Against
Over 4 million additional acre-feet of water will be delivered to Sindh as a result of the construction of the Kalabagh dam. Shamsul Mulk, a WAPDA engineer, said that China would produce about 30,000 megawatts of electricity from dams while outlining Kalabagh Dam's advantages. "Even India has more than 4,000 dams," he declared. "By not building dams, we lose billions of dollars."
Conclusion
The Kalabagh Dam opposition is irrational and based on political bluster. The United Nations predicted that Pakistan's biggest issue this century would be a lack of water.
A severe energy crisis has gripped the nation for a number of years. Nobody even brings about the Kalabagh Dam. By the end of the 1980s, Pakistan was using 30% thermal energy and 70% hydroelectric power to meet its energy needs. By 2012–2013, Pakistan was producing up to 44% of its thermal energy from expensive furnace oil and diesel, with the remaining 56% coming from other, primarily thermal, sources. The pricing shift had a domino effect, driving up consumers' costs.
Despite having a low cost of generation, hydel energy is still generally ignored. Many power plants in the public sector have outlived their usefulness. Circular debt will keep growing in the absence of more affordable electricity. A convenient justification for the energy issue is the circular debt that has built up in the electricity sector. When consumers in the downstream fail to pay suppliers (or producers) in the upstream in a timely manner, this debt mounts. The defaulters are who? They consist of not only common people but also the provinces, the public sector, significant businesses, and strong people (including political tycoons). If the government does not make the generous payment, the thermal producer will need to borrow (and eventually pay interest charges and return the negotiated loan) and find alternate sources of financing.
The answer is straightforward: power distribution firms should pay their debts to generation companies on time.
Circular debt is simply the surface of the problem, though. There are numerous other issues that plague the energy situation. The government must develop a strategy that gives the power industry top priority.
Due to India's belligerent behaviour (surgical strikes, territorial aggression in Kashmir, etc.), the meeting was postponed.
The Indus Waters Treaty, supported by the World Bank, is a water-sharing agreement between India and Pakistan to utilise the water present in the Indus River and its tributaries. The Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers in the west belong to Pakistan, and the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej rivers in the east belong to India, according to the treaty.
The Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi rivers, totalling about 33 million acre feet (MAF) annually, are allotted to India for unrestricted use under the terms of the Indus Waters Treaty, while the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers, totalling about 135 MAF annually, primarily go to Pakistan. India has been granted the right, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, to produce hydroelectricity through run-of-the-river projects on the western rivers, subject to particular requirements for design and operation.
The Tarbela Dam on the Indus River and the Mangla Dam on the Jhelum River are only two examples of the dams that the treaty called for funding and constructing.
The Indus River System has been used for irrigation throughout unbroken India since the beginning of time. Modern irrigation engineering, however, dates back to the British era of administration in the 1850s. The 1947 partition of India into the nations of India and Pakistan made the treaty necessary.
David Lilienthal, a former leader of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commision, is credited with seeing the deal through to completion.
The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in September 1960 by Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru after six years of negotiations. The Indus-Water Treaty mandated the establishment of a Permanent Indus Commision, consisting of one commissioner from each nation, to settle any disagreements on the layout, style, and other elements of the dams that the two nations may construct on the designated rivers. Despite frequent wars between the two nations, the Indus Treaty held despite bellicose declarations to annul it.
Despite Pakistan's protests, India finished construction of the Kishanganga dam in occupied Kashmir and carried on with work on the Ratle hydroelectric power station on the Chenab River in 2017.
Pakistan struggled to build new dams in the post-Ayub era, especially the Kalabagh Dam. Due to pointless complaints made by the three provinces of Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the dam's construction was delayed.
Pakistan's lawmakers continued to engage in pettifogging or plots to overthrow whichever administration was in power rather than working to reach a compromise on the crucial water projects.
Kalabagh Dam's necessity
Between 2003 and 2005, the Technical Committee on Water Resources gave its approval to this project. However, it has been more than 15 years since the feasibility report was put into action. Currently, it is a point of contention between three of the four provinces (excluding the Punjab). The interprovincial committee was, in fact, made up of eight technical specialists, two from each province.
Along with the development of mangrove forests, the Committee also examined all other factors, such as the impact of mixing seawater and freshwater, seawater seepage into the groundwater, riverine irrigation, and forest fisheries (including the cultivation of Pala fish, shrimp, kharif, and rabi). The World Bank Indus Special Study Group had previously given the project the go-ahead in its 1967 report, Development of Water and Power Resources of Pakistan: A Sectoral Analysis. The expected cost at the time, spread across six years from 1977 to 1982, was US$6.12 billion.
The Tarbela Dam might have been completed by 1982 after inauguration in 1976. The price of 12 billion units of KBD's hydroelectric power was Rs1.5 per unit as opposed to Rs16.5 from thermal sources.
The dam was intended to be a container for storing monsoon floods from the mighty Indus' upper reaches.
At the time, we had a 400–5000 MW power shortfall. The dam's construction was reported to have cost US$6.12 billion and took six years, from 1977 to 1982. The Tarbela Dam might have been completed by 1982 after inauguration in 1976. The price of 12 billion units of hydroelectric power was Rs. 1.5 per unit as opposed to Rs. 16.5 from thermal sources. Due to 10 times more expensive production (12 billion x Rs. 15 billion), we are losing Rs. 180 billion annually. Add a loss of US$6.12 billion annually from the Arabian Sea receiving an extra 30 million Acre Feet of water per year from the Kotri Barrage (each MAF is worth US$1–1.5 billion).
When compared to population growth, from 32.4 million in 1948 to 154.6 million in 2005 and 207.8 million in 2017, our water resource reserves have not increased pari passu. Rivers flow at 84 percent during kharif season but at just 40 percent during rabi season. Pakistan's current water storage capacity is just about 11.77 million acres per feet (MAF), or about 8% of the yearly flow.
Water Crisis Causes
Three provincial assembly made decisions to oppose constructing the KBD. According to a politician, Sind would become a desert as a result of the dam. Reviewing the Water Apportionment Accord should assuage concerns about the project (as instructed by the Lahore High Court in its Order dated November 29, 2012, case number. WP 8777). There is no excuse for killing the goose that produces golden eggs.
Delays-Related Losses
Due to the project's 10-time more expensive development, losses from delays have increased to Rs180 billion year (1990 estimate). In addition, the Arabian Sea receives an extra 30 million acre feet of water each year from the Kotri Barrage, costing $6.12 billion annually. Rivers flow at 84% during the mangrove season, but barely at 40% during the Rabi season. Pakistan's current water storage capacity is just about 11.77MAF, or about 8% of the annual flow.
With the exception of the Punjab province, the legislative assembly of three of our provinces have vehemently opposed building the Kala Bagh Dam. Are they appropriate? In order to respond to the question, we must examine many facets of the dam's construction, including its viability and effects. Since the Eighteenth Amendment was passed, provinces are now responsible for building dams. Water security is still more of a national issue than a regional one, notwithstanding this reality.
Arguments For and Against
Over 4 million additional acre-feet of water will be delivered to Sindh as a result of the construction of the Kalabagh dam. Shamsul Mulk, a WAPDA engineer, said that China would produce about 30,000 megawatts of electricity from dams while outlining Kalabagh Dam's advantages. "Even India has more than 4,000 dams," he declared. "By not building dams, we lose billions of dollars."
Conclusion
The Kalabagh Dam opposition is irrational and based on political bluster. The United Nations predicted that Pakistan's biggest issue this century would be a lack of water.
A severe energy crisis has gripped the nation for a number of years. Nobody even brings about the Kalabagh Dam. By the end of the 1980s, Pakistan was using 30% thermal energy and 70% hydroelectric power to meet its energy needs. By 2012–2013, Pakistan was producing up to 44% of its thermal energy from expensive furnace oil and diesel, with the remaining 56% coming from other, primarily thermal, sources. The pricing shift had a domino effect, driving up consumers' costs.
Despite having a low cost of generation, hydel energy is still generally ignored. Many power plants in the public sector have outlived their usefulness. Circular debt will keep growing in the absence of more affordable electricity. A convenient justification for the energy issue is the circular debt that has built up in the electricity sector. When consumers in the downstream fail to pay suppliers (or producers) in the upstream in a timely manner, this debt mounts. The defaulters are who? They consist of not only common people but also the provinces, the public sector, significant businesses, and strong people (including political tycoons). If the government does not make the generous payment, the thermal producer will need to borrow (and eventually pay interest charges and return the negotiated loan) and find alternate sources of financing.
The answer is straightforward: power distribution firms should pay their debts to generation companies on time.
Circular debt is simply the surface of the problem, though. There are numerous other issues that plague the energy situation. The government must develop a strategy that gives the power industry top priority.
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